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Abstract
A continuous variable controlled quantum dialogue scheme is proposed. The scheme is further modified to obtain two
other protocols of continuous variable secure multiparty computation. The first one of these protocols provides a solution
of two party socialist millionaire problem, while the second protocol provides a solution for a special type of multi-party
socialist millionaire problem which can be viewed as a protocol for multiparty quantum private comparison. It is shown
that the proposed scheme of continuous variable controlled quantum dialogue can be performed using bipartite entanglement
and can be reduced to obtain several other two and three party cryptographic schemes in the limiting cases. The security
of the proposed scheme and its advantage over corresponding discrete variable counterpart are also discussed. Specifically,
the ignorance of an eavesdropper in the proposed scheme is shown to be very high compared with corresponding discrete
variable scheme and thus the present scheme is less prone to information leakage inherent with the discrete variable quantum
dialogue based schemes.It is further established that the proposed scheme can be viewed as a continuous variable counterpart
of quantum cryptographic switch which allows a supervisor to control the information transferred between the two legitimate
parties to a continuously varying degree.
1 Introduction
With RSA [1] and similar classical cryptographic schemes [2] facing attacks from the advent of scalable quantum computers
in the near future, quantum cryptography provides a necessary alternative. As the security in secure quantum communication,
unlike classical cryptography, is not conditioned upon any assumption regarding computational powers of an eavesdropper
and comes from the physical laws described by quantum mechanics, it is expected to provide unconditional security (see [3,4]
for review). At times this unconditional security is analyzed either within the domain of quantum mechanics [5] or post-
quantum theories [6] as well as exploiting imperfections in the devices used to implement certain quantum cryptographic
scheme (see [7] for review).
The first quantum cryptographic scheme which allowed two distant parties Alice and Bob to procure secure random
key using quantum resources is now known as BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD) [8]. This pioneering
work was followed by several QKD schemes [9–12] and the schemes for several other quantum cryptographic tasks [13–21].
Among these numerous quantum cryptography schemes, direct secure quantum communication schemes are interesting as
they allow to perform secure communication without prior generation/distribution of key [13–15], and thus it resolves all the
issues with secure key distribution and key management. The direct communication schemes are accomplished by splitting
the useful information after encoding secret message in such a manner that the sender (Alice) reveals a part of this to the
receiver (Bob) to decode her message only after confirmation of no eavesdropping attempt. In the meanwhile, Eve’s attacks
fail to reveal her anything in the absence of Alice’s part of the information. Generalizations of these direct secure quantum
communication schemes for two-way [18, 20, 22], three-party controlled [16, 20], and multiparty [21] communication tasks
are also proposed in the past. Information is encoded on discrete systems in all these quantum communication schemes,
and photon counters are used to decode the secret. In contrast, continuous variable (CV) quantum cryptography schemes
for QKD are also proposed in the past [23–28] where information is encoded by modulating the quadratures and decoded
by homodyne or heterodyne measurement. Recently, it has been shown that CV systems provide better key generation rate
∗ashn5.new@gmail.com
†tkishore36@yahoo.com
‡anirban.pathak@gmail.com
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
00
45
8v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
1 F
eb
 20
19
and performance than that obtained in discrete variable (DV) QKD systems for relatively high transmittance channel [29].
CV schemes allow to encode a large amount of information which can also be used in broadband transmission. Further,
the implementation of CV schemes requires relatively inexpensive devices as in CV schemes, one can use commercially
available room temperature highly efficient and large bandwidth homodyne detectors and the existing optical communication
technology, but in a DV scheme, one would require cryogenic single photon detectors and efficient single photon source [30].
Thus, CV schemes fulfill the requirements for realistic metropolitan networks [30]. Therefore, using the pre-functioning
architecture in place [31], quantum tasks with CV systems are expected to find a place in the future secure communication
technology [30].
CV counterparts of the direct secure quantum communication protocols are also proposed [32–38] in the recent past.
Specifically, a protocol for CV quantum dialogue (QD) was proposed [39] using two-mode squeezed state as resource and
CV Bell measurement performed with homodyne detectors. A natural extension to this scheme is to carry out this QD task
in a manner such that a controller governs/supervises the flow of information between the two legitimate parties, known
as controlled QD (CQD) scheme. The controller has the power to terminate the proceeding if he wishes or comes across
a malfunctioning in the procedure. In case of DV CQD [16, 40], Charlie withholds either information regarding channel
preparation (i.e., Bell state shared between Alice and Bob) or final measurement outcome which restricts Alice and Bob
to gain the information of each other. More recently, it has been shown that several other two and three party quantum
cryptographic schemes can be reduced from a secure CQD scheme [19].
A closely associated field of research is secure multiparty computation [41], i.e., to compute a function with inputs given
by more than one party in a secure manner. Recently, some of the present authors have shown that some direct secure quantum
communication schemes can be used as primitives of quantum solutions for several socioeconomic problems, which can be
introduced as secure multiparty computation tasks [20, 42–44]. Motivated by the fact that there is no CV counterpart of
CQD scheme, which can be used as primitive for quantum voting [42], quantum e-commerce [20, 45], and quantum private
comparison [44], here we have proposed a CV CQD scheme and shown that it can be used to provide the solutions for
the socialist millionaire problem (SMP) in two party case and a solution for a particular type of multiparty SMP, known as
multiparty quantum private comparison.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss generation of quantum state, two-mode
squeezed state, and dense coding used in our CQD scheme. Subsequently, a CV CQD scheme is proposed in Section 3.
The application of the proposed scheme to solve SMP for two parties with an extension to carry out this task for the case of
n-parties are reported in Sections 4. Finally, we discuss the security of the proposed scheme in Section 5 before concluding
in Section 6.
2 Two-mode squeezed state generation and properties
There are various methods for generating two-mode squeezed states [46–48]. We briefly discuss the process of generating such
a state using nondegenerate optical parametric amplification (NOPA) process, which employs the nonlinear optical parametric
down conversion process to produce entangled beams in orthogonal polarization [49, 50]. Specifically, in NOPA, we may
initially start with a Nd:YAP/KTP laser to generate fundamental and second-harmonic waves as the seed and pump field inputs
for NOPA. Subsequently, these waves are sent through a type-II nonlinear KTP crystal to produce a pair of entangled light
beams through the parametric down conversion process (see [50] for experimental implementation). This process of producing
a two-mode entangled squeezed state is equivalent to theoretically applying a two-mode squeezing operator, defined as
S(r) = eir(a
†
11a
†
12−a11a12), (1)
where r is squeezing parameter.
Using the two-mode squeezed state, CV information can be transmitted using dense coding with the help of Bell measure-
ment [46], which reveals the difference of amplitude quadratures and the sum of the phase quadratures of the input modes.
The dense coding capacity for a two-mode squeezed state has been evaluated [51] to be equivalent to C = ln
(
1 + n¯+ n¯2
)
,
where n¯ is the average number of photons defined as n¯ = σ2 + sinh2(r), with σ as the variance in the probability distribution
obtained after homodyne detection.
3 Controlled quantum dialogue
In this section, we present our CQD scheme between two spatially separated parties Alice and Bob under the supervision of
Charlie. The protocol is defined in the following steps.
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Figure 1: (Color online) A schematic diagram for implementation of CV CQD.
Step 1. Charlie displaces the two input vacuum modes a′01 and a
′
02 with D(α = x
′ + ix′) and D(β = y′ + iy′) to obtain
two new modes a01 = D†(β)a′01D(β) and a02 = D
†(β)a′02D(β), respectively. Thereafter, a01 and a02 are the input
modes of NOPA. The evolution of these modes can be described by application of S(r), given in Eq. (1) on a01 and a02
to generate the two-mode squeezed vacuum states a11 and a12, with amplitude and phase given by
Xa11 = Xa01 cosh(r)±Xa02 sinh(r),
Pa11 = Pa01 cosh(r)± Pa02 sinh(r),
Xa12 = Xa02 cosh(r)±Xa01 sinh(r),
Pa12 = Pa02 cosh(r)± Pa01 sinh(r).
(2)
Subsequently, Charlie performs Bell Measurement on the output modes to obtain
Xµ0 = (Xa11 −Xa12)/
√
2,
Pµ0 = (Pa11 + Pa12)/
√
2
(3)
and broadcasts this information publicly.
Step 2. Charlie uses the same two input vacuum modes a′01, a
′
02, and the same two-mode squeezing operation S(r) to
produce the two-mode squeezed vacuum states a11 and a12 as in Step 1. The schematic diagram is shown in Fig. 1.
Charlie creates two random sequences RA and RB with Rij ∈ C for displacing the two modes at various time frames
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Ti in each mode to obtain a21 and a22 with
Xa21 = Xa11 + xRB ,
Xa22 = Xa12 + xRA ,
(4)
and similarly for the phase quadratures of both modes.
Step 3. He sends the entangled optical mode a21 to Bob via the quantum channel while he keeps the entangled optical mode
a22 with himself.
Step 4. On receiving the entangled optical mode a∗31 (obtained after a21 passes through the quantum channel with trans-
mission efficiency η), Bob performs an amplification (defined by gain coefficient g = 1/
√
η) on the mode and informs
Charlie that he has received it. In fact, linear amplification is performed for all the transmitted modes and will not
be discussed repeatedly. Bob and Charlie check for eavesdropping by measuring either the amplitude or phase in a
given time frame T1. If their measurement outcomes are found to be correlated, they conclude that no eavesdropping is
attempted. Bob discards the pulses used for entanglement checking and stores the mode as a31.
Step 5. Charlie then sends the other entangled optical mode to Alice (via a quantum channel) who receives a∗32. Alice
performs linear amplification on the mode, then Alice and Bob decide a time frame T2 for checking eavesdropping.
In this step, they can also verify entanglement in their modes and ask Charlie to disclose the value of his random
displacement for the given time frame T2. With the help of Charlie’s announcement of his decoy value for the given
time frame and their measurement outcomes, they can not only check eavesdropping, but can also detect a participant
attack by Charlie as well (discussed in detail in Section 5).
Step 6. Once the security of transmission is established, Alice encodes her information on mode a32 in time frame T4 by
applying a displacement operation as a42 = D†(α)a32D(α), where α = (xA + ipA) is the message she wants to send
to Bob, leading to
Xa42 = Xa32 + xA,
Pa42 = Pa32 + pA.
(5)
She also applies random displacement operation in time frame T3 as decoy.
Step 7. Alice sends a∗52 to Bob, who performs amplification on the mode and announces its receipt. Subsequently, he
checks for eavesdropping with the help of information shared by Charlie and Alice regarding their random displacement
operations corresponding to the time frame T3. If there is eavesdropping they go to Step 2 else Bob displaces the mode
a52 in time frame T4 with D(γ), where γ = (xB + ipB) is the value that encodes the information that he wants to
communicate, to obtain
Xa62 = Xa52 + xB ,
Pa62 = Pa52 + pB .
(6)
Step 8. Bob then performs Bell measurement on both modes a31 and a62 in time frame T4, to obtain
Xµ1 = (Xa31 −Xa62)/
√
2
= (Xa31 −Xa22 − xB − xA)/
√
2
= (Xa11 −Xa12 − xB − xA + xRBT4 − xRAT4 )/
√
2
= (−xB − xA +
√
2(Xµ0) + xRBT4
− xRAT4 )/
√
2.
(7)
Finally, Bob gets
X =
√
2(Xµ1 −Xµ0) = xRBT4 − xRAT4 − xB − xA (8)
and
P =
√
2(Pµ1 − Pµ0) = pRBT4 + pRAT4 + pB + pA. (9)
Hereafter, Bob announces his final measurements X and P . At this step, Alice and Bob ask for Charlie’s encoded
information (RiT4 ) in the time frame T4, which Charlie reveals if he wants the dialogue task to be accomplished. Using
Bob’s measurement outcomes and Charlie’s information, Alice obtains the information encoded by Bob and vice versa.
Here, it is also worth mentioning that Alice and Bob may either encode discrete N -bit messages by dividing the real number
line into 2N intervals [39] or continuous messages on both quadratures. This transmission of continuous messages may be
useful in several other cryptographic schemes, where a prior shared CV secret is required (for instance, see [52, 53]).
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Figure 2: (Color online) A schematic diagram for CV solution for two party SMP.
4 Application: Socialist millionaire protocol
Here we present a solution of SMP as an application of our CV CQD scheme. Firstly, we discuss a specific case in which
two parties Alice and Bob wish to compare their assets with the help of an untrusted third party Charlie. In this task, the two
parties (millionaires) wish to compare their assets (say A and B respectively), i.e., to compute whether A > B, A < B or
A = B while maintaining secrecy of A and B both from each other and an outsider.
4.1 Two party socialist millionaire protocol
The protocol (shown schematically in Fig. 2) works as follows.
Steps 1-4. Same as Steps 1 to 4 of CQD in the previous section.
Step 5. Bob performs amplification and displaces the received mode : a31 = D†(α)a21D(α), where α = (xB + ixB) is the
amount of wealth xB (say in millions). Thus, the transformed quadrature can be written as
Xa31 = Xa21 + xB . (10)
Step 6. Bob sends a31 to Alice, who receives a41, performs amplification and informs him regarding it. Thereafter, they
check for eavesdropping with the help of Charlie. If there is an eavesdropping attempt they abort and go back to Step 2
else Alice displaces the mode with D(−γ) with γ = (xA + ixA) depending on the amount of wealth xA (in millions).
This leads to the following transformation
Xa51 = Xa41 − xA. (11)
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Step 7. Alice sends a51 to Charlie, who receives a61. After amplification and checking for eavesdropping, Charlie performs
Bell measurement on a12 and a61, to obtain
Xµ1 = (Xa61 −Xa12)/
√
2,
= (Xa41 − xA −Xa12)/
√
2,
= (Xa21 + xB − xA −Xa12)/
√
2,
= (xB − xA −
√
2Xµ0)/
√
2.
(12)
Hence, we have
X =
√
2(Xµ1 +Xµ0) = xB − xA. (13)
For X = 0, both Alice and Bob have the same amount of wealth. Otherwise, for X > 0 (X < 0), Bob has more (less)
wealth than that of Alice. Thus, Charlie can conclude which millionaire has more assets and announce the result.
4.2 Multiparty socialist millionaire problem
We further discuss a more general scenario where n parties wish to compare their assets [54,55]. It also serves our motivation
that the CQD scheme proposed here has scalability for the purpose of its implementation for quantum networks. With these
intentions we have extended our SMP solution to the multiparty case, where the nth party is requested by Charlie to encode
−(n− 1) times his/her current wealth (in millions). The protocol is as follows.
Steps 1-5. Same as Steps 1 to 5 of the previous protocol.
Step 6. Each of the following n − 1 parties including Bob displace their transmitted mode by the same amount as their
wealth.
Step 7. The nth millionaire displaces the mode by −(n− 1) times the amount of his/her wealth xn.
Step 8. After checking for eavesdropping, Charlie performs Bell measurement on a12 and a61, to obtain
X =
√
2(Xµ1 +Xµ0) =
n−1∑
i=1
xi − (n− 1)xn. (14)
For X = 0, Charlie concludes all millionaires have an equivalent amount of wealth. Otherwise, for X > 0 or X < 0,
Charlie announces that the wealth of millionaires are not equal.
Note that all the cases when X 6= 0, the result is inconclusive. Thus, the present solution solves only a limiting case of the
SMP known as quantum private comparison [44, 55], where only equality of the assets of all the parties is to be verified. On
the other hand, this also states that multiparty secure computation/communication becomes complex and thus the solution is
not always trivially extendable.
5 Security
Here we are going to discuss a set of individual attacks Eve can attempt and thereby we aim to establish that our protocol is
secure against such attacks [39]. Generally, Eve may attempt the set of attacks discussed here in all three proposed schemes,
unless stated otherwise; and thus security of all the proposed scheme is discussed together. First of all, we will briefly
discuss information leakage inherent in quantum dialogue based schemes (see [18] and references therein for detail). As total
information encoded in most of the quantum dialogue based schemes is twice the channel capacity C, such a scheme naturally
leads to leakage of one-half of the encoded information as Eve’s ignorance is equal to either Alice’s or Bob’s encoding. In
the present case, Alice (or equivalently Bob) encodes a continuous message in both amplitude and phase quadratures; and
thus unlike a DV QD, where Eve has to choose between only few possibilities (as 4 choices in [22]), Eve has infinitely many
options. Thus, Eve’s ignorance is equal to the channel capacity C, which shows the advantage of CV over DV scheme,
whereas information leakage–same as channel capacity–can be circumvented in CV CQD scheme by transmitting Charlie’s
random operations in a secure manner to Alice and Bob (as suggested in [18]).
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5.1 Mutual information of Alice and Bob
The mutual information between Alice and Bob depends upon various parameters, such as transmittance (channel efficiency
parameter) η, excess noise , the intrinsic variance present in the beam σ, and the quantity ΣABC which implies the variance
introduced in the beam due to operations performed by Alice, Bob, and Charlie on the given mode. Mutual information
between Alice and Bob in X quadrature can be given as [56–59],
IXAB = log2
(
1 +
ηΣABC
λ+ η(σ + γ − 1)
)
. (15)
Here, we consider a simpler case such that, η = 1,  = 0, λ = 1 (2) in case of homodyne (heterodyne) detection, and
σ2 = e
−2r
4 . Further, we have ΣABC = ΣA + ΣB + ΣS(C), where S(C) is the initial random displacements made by Charlie.
The measurement result obtained by Bob after homodyne detection yields
X = (
√
2(Xµ0)− xB − xA + xRBT4 − xRAT4 )/
√
2 (16)
corresponding to the amplitude quadrature, where the information xB and xA is the encoded information while xRBT4 and
xRAT4
are random operations publicly announced by the end of the protocol. Similarly, information is encoded on the phase
quadrature as well. Therefore, total information exchanged during a run of the protocol is xA + xB + yA + yB , which would
be 4N bits if discrete encoding is performed (say 12-bit using 3 bit encoding rule in [39]). Charlie’s random operations RAT4
and RBT4 (say RC collectively) serve analogous to the cryptographic switch [16, 60], where Charlie can control the amount
of information transferred between Alice and Bob to a continuously varying degree by only revealing part of RC .
5.2 Disturbance Attack
In this attack, Eve tries to mislead both parties either by sending random optical mode to either Bob (or equivalently Alice)
or applying a random displacement operation while transmission. Note that Eve does not wish to extract the secret in this
attack. This attack forbids the legitimate parties from accomplishing the task. To rescue the protocol from this particular
attack, initially Charlie and Bob, and later Alice and Bob check for eavesdropping by looking for entanglement between their
modes using the initial information; if they find at any stage, that the modes shared between both the parties are not entangled
they discard the protocol.
Specifically, the random displacement applied by Charlie and the initial public information lead to
Xa21 = Xa11 + xRB ,
X ′µ0 = (Xa31 −Xa12)/
√
2. (17)
Since Bob measures Xa31 and knows the initial information X
′
µ0 , he calculates the result to be announced by Charlie as
X =
√
2X ′µ0 − Xa31 , and if Charlie announces the same measurement outcome then Bob can conclude that eavesdropping
is not attempted. In a similar manner, one can verify in the case when Alice receives the mode from Charlie and when Alice
sends her mode to Bob.
5.3 Man in the middle attack
Eve may also behave as an impostor and take on the identity of Alice (Bob) to Bob (Alice) and start exchanging information
with the other party. An authenticated classical communication is used in the protocol which forbids Eve from this attack.
Eve may also intercept the optical mode sent from Charlie to Bob and sends an auxiliary mode to Bob. Though Eve is
aware of the initial information Xµ0 , it will not help her as both Bob and Charlie would announce measurement outcomes
that would not be correlated. Specifically, Eve may prepare two-mode squeezed vacuum with same Xµ0 and would attempt to
escape undetected during Charlie to Bob (Alice) eavesdropping checking and subsequently intercept Alice to Bob transmission
to decode Alice’s secret. With the help of Bob’s (Alice’s) and Charlie’s announcement of measurement outcomes, Eve may
know the corresponding value of xRi but the choice of RA and RB is random for each time frame. Therefore, Eve would not
have any advantage.
5.4 Cloning attack
Note that Charlie prepares two-mode squeezed vacuum state and sends both modes to Bob and Alice, respectively. Therefore,
both modes are accessible to Eve at some instant of time (though not simultaneously). This may allow Eve to design a quantum
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cloning attack to make as exact copy as possible of Charlie to Alice transmitted mode and intercept Alice to Bob transmission
to extract Alice’s secret from that. The universal cloning machine [61] for P → Q in general acts in the following way∣∣ψ⊗P 〉⊗ ∣∣∣r⊗(Q−P )〉⊗ (|A〉) U−→ |Φ〉 . (18)
Here, |ψ〉 is copied on the suitably chosen reference state |r〉 with an additional requirement of ancilla |A〉. Not only Eve is
unable to clone it exactly, the random displacement operations by Charlie (RC) forbid her to decode Alice’s secret. Further,
the variance introduced by the cloned state in both quadratures corresponding to the transmitted mode would not be zero, i.e.,
the initial variance for the amplitude quadrature, say σC→A = σ + ΣS(C), would change to σ′C→A 6= σC→A after being
cloned by Eve. This would leave detectable traces in entanglement checking.
5.5 Beam splitter attack
In this type of attack Eve uses a set of beam splitters to obtain information encoded by Alice, by applying a beam splitter in
Charlie to Bob transmission and one during Alice to Bob transmission. In first step she uses a beam splitter on the two modes,
a21 and e11, with a transmission coefficient β1 resulting in
Xa51 =
√
β1Xa21 +
√
1− β1Xe11 ,
Pa51 =
√
β1Pa21 +
√
1− β1Pe11 ,
Xe21 =
√
β1Xe11 +
√
1− β1Xa21 ,
Pe21 =
√
β1Pe11 +
√
1− β1Pa21 .
(19)
Eve uses a quantum memory to store one of these modes e21 and sends the mode a51 to Bob via the quantum channel. In
the second step, Eve intercepts the transmitted mode a42 while Alice to Bob transmission and uses her auxiliary mode e12 as
inputs of a beam splitter (with transmission coefficient β2) giving the following results
Xa82 =
√
β2Xa42 +
√
1− β2Xe12 ,
Pa82 =
√
β2Pa42 +
√
1− β2Pe12 ,
Xe22 =
√
β2Xe12 +
√
1− β2Xa42 ,
Pe22 =
√
β2Pe12 +
√
1− β2Pa42 .
(20)
Eve now sends the mode a82 to Bob, while she keeps the mode e22 with herself. Hereafter, she sends modes e22 and e21
through two inputs of a beam splitter (with transmission coefficient β3). This operation can be defined as
Xe32 =
√
β3Xe22 +
√
1− β3Xe21 ,
Pe32 =
√
β3Pe22 +
√
1− β3Pe21 ,
Xe31 =
√
β3Xe21 +
√
1− β3Xe22 ,
Pe31 =
√
β3Pe21 +
√
1− β3Pe22 .
(21)
Subsequently, Eve chooses to measure the amplitude quadrature of mode e32 and the phase quadrature of e31 to obtain Bob’s
secret. This leads to the following result in case of amplitude quadrature
Xa110 =
√
β2β3Xe12 +
√
(1− β2)β3Xa12 +
√
(1− β3)(1− β1)Xa11 +
√
(1− β3)(β1)Xe11
−
√
(1− β3)(1− β1)xRB +
√
(β3)(1− β2)xRA +
√
(1− β2)β3xA. (22)
In order to obtain any useful information, such as xA, Eve would require the values of variables xRB and xRA . Irrespective
of this Eve would be detected during eavesdropping checking performed by Charlie and Bob.
5.6 Trojan horse attack
There are few attacks by an eavesdropper, which exploit the experimental limitations or imperfections of devices and are
mostly implementation dependent. Security against such attacks cannot be established theoretically, but experimentally can
be maintained by using several isolators [62]. In the present case, Eve may attempt to obtain Alice’s information using a
Trojan pulse sent with mode a∗32 going from Charlie to Alice and filter the same pulse while Alice to Bob transmission (as
shown in Fig. 3). However, Alice can circumvent such attack [63] by using frequency filters and additional equipment to
detect Eve’s Trojan pulse.
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Figure 3: (Color online) A schematic diagram for Trojan horse attack.
5.7 Malicious user’s attack or internal attack
A participant attack is difficult to circumvent than an outsider’s attack. In these attacks, one of the parties would like to take
advantage of the limited access to information to get the remaining secret. As an example, we assume that Charlie, who is the
controller, makes a malicious attempt to obtain the information of Alice and/or Bob, either during Alice to Bob transmission
or after Bob has announced the measurement result. Here, we show how our protocol is safe against such an attack, in which
Charlie tries to intercept during Alice to Bob transmission and exploiting his power as a controller tries to deduce Bob’s
information. Specifically, Charlie knows the initial information and the random displacement he has applied on both the
modes thus obtained, he tries to decipher the information encoded by Alice.
Charlie may attempt to send an auxiliary mode to Bob and keep the mode entangled with Alice to perform Bell measure-
ment and get her information. Interestingly, Charlie may even attempt to prepare a separable state. However, Alice and Bob
perform entanglement checking in Step 5 of the proposed scheme, where these attacks by Charlie would be revealed.
Let us suppose Charlie tries to obtain Bob and/or Alice’s information after Bob has announced the Bell measurement
result, i.e.,
X = xRBT4
− xRAT4 − xB − xA. (23)
Hence, Charlie would be able to obtain xB + xA = xRBT4 − xRAT4 −X. Though Charlie knows all the information on the
right-hand side of the above equation, he would not be able to obtain any information hereafter unless he knows either the
encoding by Alice or Bob. For this he may try to measure, clone, or guess Alice’s mode, but that would reduce to an outsider’s
attack discussed previously.
5.8 Malicious Alice/Bob in socialist millionaire problem
So far we have discussed the attacks possible on all the schemes proposed here. Here, we are going to discuss some particular
attacks relevant only in the solution proposed for SMP. Specifically, Alice and Bob wish to transmit their secrets to each other
in CQD under the supervision of Charlie. In contrast, they do not trust each other in SMP and wish to take advantage of
participant attack to know each other’s encoding. Also, Charlie already knows the initial and final parameters of two-mode
squeezed vacuum state prepared and measured by him. If somehow he gets to know Alice’s (Bob’s) encoding he would get the
Bob’s (Alice’s) secret. Therefore, here Alice and Bob use a CV quantum key [59] to circumvent Charlie’s participant attack.
Further, Alice and Bob being distrustful parties may attempt to get inaccessible information of each other. First of all,
one mode remains with Charlie and thus both Alice and Bob always encode and have access to a mixed state only. However,
any attack by Alice (Bob) on Charlie-Bob (Alice-Charlie) transmission would reduce to an outsider’s attack, which is already
discussed. This includes attack by Alice where she would perform intercept and resend on Charlie-Bob transmission. There-
fore, neither Alice nor Bob can take advantage of being a participant in the scheme to get each other’s secret. Further, in the
multiparty version of SMP solution proposed here, collusion attacks by the participants can be circumvented in analogy of
other circular quantum cryptographic schemes ( [21, 43] and references therein).
6 Conclusion
In view of the advantages of CV communication schemes at metropolitan scale and controlled quantum communication in
general, we have proposed here a new CQD protocol based on CV two-mode squeezed vacuum state. The scheme has several
intrinsic advantages. For example, it does not require tripartite entanglement unlike other controlled communication schemes;
it can be used as a primitive to obtain solutions for several socioeconomic problems. As a particular example, we have
discussed a CV solution of SMP using our proposed scheme. Due to use of only bipartite entanglement in the present scheme,
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it motivates us to look for a generalization of the present scheme which can be performed over quantum communication
networks and would be implementable with the existing infrastructure. However, a close look at the multiparty SMP solution
reveals that it only solves special case of the problem known as quantum private comparison, which can be attributed to the
fact that with an increase in the number of parties, complexity of the desired task also increases.
The security of the proposed scheme against some individual and participant attacks is also provided with the help of decoy
pulses. The present scheme can be viewed as a CV counterpart of the idea of a quantum cryptographic switch which allows
the supervisor to vary the information accessible to the receivers in a continuously varying degree. Further, the present scheme
increases the ignorance of an eavesdropper as he needs to guess out of the infinitely many possible encoding operations by
Alice (or equivalently Bob). Thus, it is less prone to the information leakage inherent with QD based schemes.
The proposed scheme can also be used as primitive to design quantum cryptographic schemes for e-commerce and voting.
We are further working on extension of such a protocol in case of n parties and study the case where we might have more than
one controller and how this may lead to a dynamic quantum communication network infrastructure.
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